pheelyks
Jan 25, 2012 | #1
Let's let readers judge for themselves, shall we?
The ever-increasing rate at which scientific knowledge has been acquired and accumulated in the past several centuries has had several effects on the way in which science is viewed. The twentieth century was a time of major introspection for many in the scientific community, and was also the period in which two giants of the philosophy of science emerged. Karl Popper came first with his theory of falsifiability, and in the early part of the second half of the century Thomas Kuhn came into prominence with his theory of paradigm shifts and the revolutionary model of scientific progress (Bigelow, Townsend, & Verdnik 2011: 69, 83). The theories of these two philosophers of science are not mutually exclusive, with Popper more concerned about how science should be consciously practiced and Kuhn engaged in an examination of the large-scale history of scientific progress, which is far beyond the conscious control of any individual scientist and even the scientific community as a whole (Bigelow et al: 69-100). The different focuses of Popper and Kuhn's theories, in fact, can in the opinion of this author serve as useful complements to each other in ways that the philosophers themselves might have never intended.
Centuries before Popper and Kuhn were glimmers in their parents' eyes, real widespread scientific experimentation and measurement began to take place in Europe for the first time since the classical period, and in manners that became increasingly rigorous and objective. Objectivity was far from absolute, however, and many theories now known to be grossly incorrect and even entirely unfounded took hold or were perpetuated by the scientists and scientific inquiries of the era. One such set of theories are the so-theories of generation that persisted for centuries-millennia, in some cases-that attempted to describe how offspring were made and how life arose. Ranging from Hippocratic Theory, in which a mingling of fluids in varying proportions leads to the formation of an offspring, to the theory of emboitment, which posits that all future generations of all species currently exist in the wombs of the females of the species, in layers of miniatures stacked like nesting dolls, many of these theories contain slight traces of half-truth, but all were also ultimately proven wrong (Bigelow et al 2011: 126-30). Tracing the progression of these theories from the seventeenth century through the nineteenth century when they were finally disproven shows that Popperian views make for important commentary on the issues encountered in the many theories of generation, while Kuhn's model of scientific progress provides an accurate map of progress in this specific area.
Karl Popper's contributions to the theory and practice of science are now so ubiquitous it can be difficult to imagine the practice of science without them. Paramount in Popper's theory is the concept of falsifiability. In order for a statement or theory to be scientific, in Popper's view, it has to be falsifiable-there must be some way to test it that would, given a certain potential outcome, prove the theory wrong. While this might seem counterintuitive when stated in such terms, it can easily be seen in many common scientific experiments carried out every day: pharmaceutical trials test drugs for efficacy, and these drugs very often fail to be effective; their hypothesized usefulness is falsified. Failing to falsify a scientific theory means that it has survived all current tests and can be thought of as scientifically valid, though by no means proven. Science ought to advance, then, by the making of observations, the development of falsifiable hypotheses, and then experimental (or observational) attempts to falsify these hypotheses or prove them to be wrong/inadequate; failing to prove a hypothesis falsified makes it a viable scientific explanation for the observed phenomena, while succeeding in falsifying the hypothesis will provide at least some amount of new information that can then be used to develop a new hypothesis/explanation, beginning the process again (Akinci 2004: 28-49; Bigelow et al 2011: 69-82).
While Popper dedicated his scholarly pursuits to determining the way in which science ought to be practiced, Kuhn examined the historical trends of the way in which scientific though and knowledge progressed and progress (Bigelow et al 2011: 124). According to the basic framework developed by Kuhn, which has been highly influential in modern scientific thought and understandings yet which remains controversial in some circles, there are two phases or types of scientific advancement: periods in which generally accepted theories are put to work in incremental scientific experiments and advances, and "revolutionary" periods in which a particular scientific community rejects previously accepted theories in favor of new understandings of their particular area of science or research questions (Bigelow et al 2011: 83-100). Revolutions are often invisible, Kuhn claims, and only fully observable and definable after the fact, with the scientific community(ies) involved not necessarily entirely aware of the implications of such revolutions when they occur (Kuhn 1996: 138-142; Bigelow et al 2011: 95). Kuhn's view of scientific history is not at all incompatible with Popper's view of scientific methodology, as an examination of theories of generation demonstrates.
Both Popper and Kuhn are ultimately concerned with scientific progress and how it is achieved, despite the fact that they approach this issue from very different angles and reach very different conclusions on the matter. Few periods provide more examples with which to examine these theorists' conclusions than the nineteenth century, when science can be said to have truly come into its own as part of the Industrial Age. It was during this century that the centuries- or millennia-old theories of generation were finally discarded in favor of the genetic and chromosomal theory in existence today, and that the process of generation began to develop towards its current understanding (Bigelow et al 2011: 124-5). Beginning with William Harvey in the seventeenth century, who rejected the long-held theory that male and female seminal fluids intermingled and that the proportion of the intermingling determined the characteristics of the offspring and advocated a more direct and observational approach to acquiring scientific knowledge altogether, a rapid advancement in theories of generation took place (Olson 2008: 24; Bigelow et al 2011: 131). In hindsight, this can be seen as the beginning of a Kuhn-style revolution, which in a sense culminated with Darwin's work in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in which patterns of variation in offspring were attributed to a then-unknown genetic mingling (Bigelow et al 2011: 156-9).
Though Darwin's theory was incomplete and in some fundamental aspects incorrect, the approach to investigation he utilized helped place others on the right path to the development of more comprehensive and accurate theories, and could be seen to constitute a paradigm shift such as those described by Kuhn (Bigelow et al: 83-125). Darwin's approach to investigation and indeed many of the other investigations undertaken in the preceding years can also be seen as aligned with Popper's concept of falsification: rather than continuing to trust the assumptions and faulty observations made by others, scientists like Harvey and Darwin rejected (at times more completely and successfully than others) certain preconceived notions and theories after testing such theories through their own observations and experiments (Bigelow et al 2011: 131-85). Though scientists of the era did not explicitly define falsifiability as a criteria for a statement or theory to be considered "scientific," there was a clear trend towards attempting to falsify existing theories in order to promote scientific advancement, their practice of science is much more in line with Popper's requirements than in previous eras of science (Bigelow et al 2011: 131-85). Thus the Kuhnian revolution that took place in regards to theories of generation was largely Popperian in methodology, and one could even say that the paradigm shift that took place as described by Kuhn was towards a practice of science as described by Popper.
Conclusion
Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn remain hugely influential figures in most if not all scientific communities. Though their theories are not accepted let alone utilized by everyone that labels themselves a scientist or researcher, they have indisputably created an intense reexamination of the progress and progress of science. When it comes to the theories of generation that perished in the nineteenth century, both Popper and Kuhn's explanations shed some light on the forces that might have contributed to this radical growth in scientific understanding.
References
Akinci, S. Popper's Conventionalism. in Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, Catton, P., ed. New York: Routledge.
Bigleow, J., Townsend, A., & Verdnik, D. Thinking About Science. Monash University.
Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Olson, R. Science and Scientism in Nineteenth Century Europe. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Nineteenth Century Theories of Generation and Twentieth Century Theories of Science: Harvey, Darwin, Popper, and Kuhn
The ever-increasing rate at which scientific knowledge has been acquired and accumulated in the past several centuries has had several effects on the way in which science is viewed. The twentieth century was a time of major introspection for many in the scientific community, and was also the period in which two giants of the philosophy of science emerged. Karl Popper came first with his theory of falsifiability, and in the early part of the second half of the century Thomas Kuhn came into prominence with his theory of paradigm shifts and the revolutionary model of scientific progress (Bigelow, Townsend, & Verdnik 2011: 69, 83). The theories of these two philosophers of science are not mutually exclusive, with Popper more concerned about how science should be consciously practiced and Kuhn engaged in an examination of the large-scale history of scientific progress, which is far beyond the conscious control of any individual scientist and even the scientific community as a whole (Bigelow et al: 69-100). The different focuses of Popper and Kuhn's theories, in fact, can in the opinion of this author serve as useful complements to each other in ways that the philosophers themselves might have never intended.
Centuries before Popper and Kuhn were glimmers in their parents' eyes, real widespread scientific experimentation and measurement began to take place in Europe for the first time since the classical period, and in manners that became increasingly rigorous and objective. Objectivity was far from absolute, however, and many theories now known to be grossly incorrect and even entirely unfounded took hold or were perpetuated by the scientists and scientific inquiries of the era. One such set of theories are the so-theories of generation that persisted for centuries-millennia, in some cases-that attempted to describe how offspring were made and how life arose. Ranging from Hippocratic Theory, in which a mingling of fluids in varying proportions leads to the formation of an offspring, to the theory of emboitment, which posits that all future generations of all species currently exist in the wombs of the females of the species, in layers of miniatures stacked like nesting dolls, many of these theories contain slight traces of half-truth, but all were also ultimately proven wrong (Bigelow et al 2011: 126-30). Tracing the progression of these theories from the seventeenth century through the nineteenth century when they were finally disproven shows that Popperian views make for important commentary on the issues encountered in the many theories of generation, while Kuhn's model of scientific progress provides an accurate map of progress in this specific area.Falsifiability and Paradigm Shifts
Karl Popper's contributions to the theory and practice of science are now so ubiquitous it can be difficult to imagine the practice of science without them. Paramount in Popper's theory is the concept of falsifiability. In order for a statement or theory to be scientific, in Popper's view, it has to be falsifiable-there must be some way to test it that would, given a certain potential outcome, prove the theory wrong. While this might seem counterintuitive when stated in such terms, it can easily be seen in many common scientific experiments carried out every day: pharmaceutical trials test drugs for efficacy, and these drugs very often fail to be effective; their hypothesized usefulness is falsified. Failing to falsify a scientific theory means that it has survived all current tests and can be thought of as scientifically valid, though by no means proven. Science ought to advance, then, by the making of observations, the development of falsifiable hypotheses, and then experimental (or observational) attempts to falsify these hypotheses or prove them to be wrong/inadequate; failing to prove a hypothesis falsified makes it a viable scientific explanation for the observed phenomena, while succeeding in falsifying the hypothesis will provide at least some amount of new information that can then be used to develop a new hypothesis/explanation, beginning the process again (Akinci 2004: 28-49; Bigelow et al 2011: 69-82).
While Popper dedicated his scholarly pursuits to determining the way in which science ought to be practiced, Kuhn examined the historical trends of the way in which scientific though and knowledge progressed and progress (Bigelow et al 2011: 124). According to the basic framework developed by Kuhn, which has been highly influential in modern scientific thought and understandings yet which remains controversial in some circles, there are two phases or types of scientific advancement: periods in which generally accepted theories are put to work in incremental scientific experiments and advances, and "revolutionary" periods in which a particular scientific community rejects previously accepted theories in favor of new understandings of their particular area of science or research questions (Bigelow et al 2011: 83-100). Revolutions are often invisible, Kuhn claims, and only fully observable and definable after the fact, with the scientific community(ies) involved not necessarily entirely aware of the implications of such revolutions when they occur (Kuhn 1996: 138-142; Bigelow et al 2011: 95). Kuhn's view of scientific history is not at all incompatible with Popper's view of scientific methodology, as an examination of theories of generation demonstrates.
Life's Origins and Scientific Progress
Both Popper and Kuhn are ultimately concerned with scientific progress and how it is achieved, despite the fact that they approach this issue from very different angles and reach very different conclusions on the matter. Few periods provide more examples with which to examine these theorists' conclusions than the nineteenth century, when science can be said to have truly come into its own as part of the Industrial Age. It was during this century that the centuries- or millennia-old theories of generation were finally discarded in favor of the genetic and chromosomal theory in existence today, and that the process of generation began to develop towards its current understanding (Bigelow et al 2011: 124-5). Beginning with William Harvey in the seventeenth century, who rejected the long-held theory that male and female seminal fluids intermingled and that the proportion of the intermingling determined the characteristics of the offspring and advocated a more direct and observational approach to acquiring scientific knowledge altogether, a rapid advancement in theories of generation took place (Olson 2008: 24; Bigelow et al 2011: 131). In hindsight, this can be seen as the beginning of a Kuhn-style revolution, which in a sense culminated with Darwin's work in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in which patterns of variation in offspring were attributed to a then-unknown genetic mingling (Bigelow et al 2011: 156-9).
Though Darwin's theory was incomplete and in some fundamental aspects incorrect, the approach to investigation he utilized helped place others on the right path to the development of more comprehensive and accurate theories, and could be seen to constitute a paradigm shift such as those described by Kuhn (Bigelow et al: 83-125). Darwin's approach to investigation and indeed many of the other investigations undertaken in the preceding years can also be seen as aligned with Popper's concept of falsification: rather than continuing to trust the assumptions and faulty observations made by others, scientists like Harvey and Darwin rejected (at times more completely and successfully than others) certain preconceived notions and theories after testing such theories through their own observations and experiments (Bigelow et al 2011: 131-85). Though scientists of the era did not explicitly define falsifiability as a criteria for a statement or theory to be considered "scientific," there was a clear trend towards attempting to falsify existing theories in order to promote scientific advancement, their practice of science is much more in line with Popper's requirements than in previous eras of science (Bigelow et al 2011: 131-85). Thus the Kuhnian revolution that took place in regards to theories of generation was largely Popperian in methodology, and one could even say that the paradigm shift that took place as described by Kuhn was towards a practice of science as described by Popper.
Conclusion
Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn remain hugely influential figures in most if not all scientific communities. Though their theories are not accepted let alone utilized by everyone that labels themselves a scientist or researcher, they have indisputably created an intense reexamination of the progress and progress of science. When it comes to the theories of generation that perished in the nineteenth century, both Popper and Kuhn's explanations shed some light on the forces that might have contributed to this radical growth in scientific understanding.
References
Akinci, S. Popper's Conventionalism. in Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, Catton, P., ed. New York: Routledge.
Bigleow, J., Townsend, A., & Verdnik, D. Thinking About Science. Monash University.
Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Olson, R. Science and Scientism in Nineteenth Century Europe. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.