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Apr 03, 2022 | #1
SYNOPSIS AND OUTLINE
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) represented a highly controversial military partnership between the United States and United Kingdom that is widely considered a failure of strategic and operational planning . This analysis will argue that, though meant to be a "joint" operation, a fundamental lack of consensus on the objectives, scope, and timeline of OIF between the US and UK ultimately resulted in a failure of this partnership. The British government's intentions to peacefully address the growing threat of Iraq's nuclear program date back to 1999 , thus this year will serve as the initial boundary for temporal consideration. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in New York City, the UK's strategy towards Iraq was shifted considerably by US intentions to stage a military intervention . By 2003, the UK was participating in its first military occupation of a sovereign state since World War II . This marked a drastic departure from the government's original intentions. This military occupation would continue until British forces were finally withdrawn in 2009, providing a closing temporal boundary for this argument .
The parameters of this argument will focus on the operational level of war. This is the level of planning that connects tactical movements within the battlefield to overarching strategy. To adequately consider how operational planning suffered, attention will be given to both American and English military leadership at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Attention will also be given to the support for OIF in both the American and English governments. This analysis will first examine the original objectives of the UK and US in entering Iraq, revealing that they were fundamentally different. It will then consider how US military leadership prevented the accomplishment of the UK's strategic objectives and failed to accommodate adequate planning at the operational level. Finally, the partnership between President Bush and Prime Minister Blair will be examined as a problematic feature of the war. Though the two leaders may be independently considered to have worked together, they did not succeed in motivating a genuine partnership between their respective governments and militaries. This lack of genuine cooperation resulted in an awkward, disjointed, and poorly executed military action with no clear objective and plan to withdraw. Based on these factors, it will be concluded that OIF did not represent a real joint operation between American and British forces.
Proposed Structure
-The United Kingdom and United States had fundamentally different strategic objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom:The United States was pursuing an objective of regime change
oThe terrorist attacks of 9/11 operated as a blanket justification for military operations in the middle east under the vague "war on terror"
oIt is highly suspected that American intelligence regarding "Weapons of Mass Destruction" was manipulated to cast suspicion on Saddam Hussein and justify his removal
-The United Kingdom wanted only to disarm Iraq of nuclear weapons
oPrior to 9/11 the UK objective was one of peaceful containment in accordance with UN Security Council recommendations
oEven after Blair's commitment to support the US' military action, the UK attempted to maintain the focus on peaceful resolution
The operational level of warfare was complicated by the tactical and strategic leadership of the US military
-The United Kingdom wanted only to disarm Iraq of nuclear weapons
oWhen Hussein was successfully removed from power, the aim of the operation simply shifted to the indefinite installation and development of a new regime
-It was unclear at what point joint forces would be recalled from Iraq
- The initial "surge" into Baghdad was the primary focus of tactical planning
- Insurgencies in the wake of this surge required tactical response but received little strategic attention
- The disjunction between strategic objectives and tactical realities made operational level planning difficult
- This resulted in an inability for joint forces to cleanly withdraw from Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom did not represent a joint action by the US and UK governments as much as it represented a joint decision by two leaders with enthusiasm for military intervention
-It may be argued that OIF was a joint operation because US president George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair were in strong agreement regarding military action
oThe intentions to pursue regime change originated with Bush in his pursuit of the "war on terror"
oBlair provided emphatic support for Bush's military intervention
-In reality, both leaders were plagued by weak support from their respective governments
oBush has widely been accused of ignoring or "strong-arming" opposition to the war in the American government
oWithin the British government, OIF quickly became known as "Blair's war" due to the lack of popular support
References
Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare (Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press 2004)
Dale, Catherine. Operation Iraqi freedom: Strategies, approaches, results, and issues for congress. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2009.
Dyson, Stephen Benedict. "Personality and foreign policy: Tony Blair's Iraq decisions." Foreign Policy Analysis 2, no. 3 (2006): 289-306.
Iraq Inquiry Committee. The Report of the Iraq Inquiry. Sir John Chilcot, et al. HC 264. London: OGL, 2016
Krebs, Ronald R., and Jennifer K. Lobasz. "Fixing the meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, coercion, and the road to war in Iraq." Security studies 16, no. 3 (2007): 409-451.
To what extent was Operation Iraqi Freedom a truly 'joint' campaign?
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) represented a highly controversial military partnership between the United States and United Kingdom that is widely considered a failure of strategic and operational planning . This analysis will argue that, though meant to be a "joint" operation, a fundamental lack of consensus on the objectives, scope, and timeline of OIF between the US and UK ultimately resulted in a failure of this partnership. The British government's intentions to peacefully address the growing threat of Iraq's nuclear program date back to 1999 , thus this year will serve as the initial boundary for temporal consideration. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in New York City, the UK's strategy towards Iraq was shifted considerably by US intentions to stage a military intervention . By 2003, the UK was participating in its first military occupation of a sovereign state since World War II . This marked a drastic departure from the government's original intentions. This military occupation would continue until British forces were finally withdrawn in 2009, providing a closing temporal boundary for this argument .
The parameters of this argument will focus on the operational level of war. This is the level of planning that connects tactical movements within the battlefield to overarching strategy. To adequately consider how operational planning suffered, attention will be given to both American and English military leadership at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Attention will also be given to the support for OIF in both the American and English governments. This analysis will first examine the original objectives of the UK and US in entering Iraq, revealing that they were fundamentally different. It will then consider how US military leadership prevented the accomplishment of the UK's strategic objectives and failed to accommodate adequate planning at the operational level. Finally, the partnership between President Bush and Prime Minister Blair will be examined as a problematic feature of the war. Though the two leaders may be independently considered to have worked together, they did not succeed in motivating a genuine partnership between their respective governments and militaries. This lack of genuine cooperation resulted in an awkward, disjointed, and poorly executed military action with no clear objective and plan to withdraw. Based on these factors, it will be concluded that OIF did not represent a real joint operation between American and British forces.Proposed Structure
-The United Kingdom and United States had fundamentally different strategic objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom:The United States was pursuing an objective of regime change
oThe terrorist attacks of 9/11 operated as a blanket justification for military operations in the middle east under the vague "war on terror"
oIt is highly suspected that American intelligence regarding "Weapons of Mass Destruction" was manipulated to cast suspicion on Saddam Hussein and justify his removal
-The United Kingdom wanted only to disarm Iraq of nuclear weapons
oPrior to 9/11 the UK objective was one of peaceful containment in accordance with UN Security Council recommendations
oEven after Blair's commitment to support the US' military action, the UK attempted to maintain the focus on peaceful resolution
The operational level of warfare was complicated by the tactical and strategic leadership of the US military
-The United Kingdom wanted only to disarm Iraq of nuclear weapons
oWhen Hussein was successfully removed from power, the aim of the operation simply shifted to the indefinite installation and development of a new regime
-It was unclear at what point joint forces would be recalled from Iraq
- The initial "surge" into Baghdad was the primary focus of tactical planning
- Insurgencies in the wake of this surge required tactical response but received little strategic attention
- The disjunction between strategic objectives and tactical realities made operational level planning difficult
- This resulted in an inability for joint forces to cleanly withdraw from Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom did not represent a joint action by the US and UK governments as much as it represented a joint decision by two leaders with enthusiasm for military intervention
-It may be argued that OIF was a joint operation because US president George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair were in strong agreement regarding military action
oThe intentions to pursue regime change originated with Bush in his pursuit of the "war on terror"
oBlair provided emphatic support for Bush's military intervention
-In reality, both leaders were plagued by weak support from their respective governments
oBush has widely been accused of ignoring or "strong-arming" opposition to the war in the American government
oWithin the British government, OIF quickly became known as "Blair's war" due to the lack of popular support
References
Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare (Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press 2004)
Dale, Catherine. Operation Iraqi freedom: Strategies, approaches, results, and issues for congress. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2009.
Dyson, Stephen Benedict. "Personality and foreign policy: Tony Blair's Iraq decisions." Foreign Policy Analysis 2, no. 3 (2006): 289-306.
Iraq Inquiry Committee. The Report of the Iraq Inquiry. Sir John Chilcot, et al. HC 264. London: OGL, 2016
Krebs, Ronald R., and Jennifer K. Lobasz. "Fixing the meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, coercion, and the road to war in Iraq." Security studies 16, no. 3 (2007): 409-451.