This was the philosophy assignment which I wanted help with from Cumstomessay.org:
Describe the picture theory of meaning in the Tractatus. How important and substantiated is the objection regarding the fact that Wittgenstein does not give any examples of elementary sentences in the book in your opinion?
This was the paper I got:
Wittgenstein and Tractatus

Outline:
A) Introduction.
B) General discussion.
C) Conclusion.
Foreword:
This research paper discusses the "picture theory of meaning" in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicum" by Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Thesis:
The "picture theory of meaning" discussed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" is an account of the nature of meaning central to author's early philosophy.
When Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", in the preface to the work he mentioned that the point of the book was ethical, and that its value consisted in the following main things: "that thoughts are expressed in it" and "that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved." At the end of the book the author writes that "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical" [emphasis added]. The problems the book refers to may be considered the problems of philosophy. But in fact it is not an easy task to define what to make of the "Tracratus Logico-Philosophicus", its author, and the propositions and theories it contains.
In fact, the book by Wittgenstein certainly does not seem to be about ethics as was mentioned by the author. It consists of numbered propositions in seven sets. Proposition 1.2 belongs to the first set and is a comment on proposition 1; proposition 1.21 is about proposition 1.2, and so on; the seventh set contains only one proposition, the famous "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004).
The author himself wrote that the main aim of this work was to emphasize on the idea that the essence of the world and of life is: This is how things are. One is tempted to add " - deal with it." But despite this, many commentators look for regular philosophical theories in his work. One of the most famous and interesting among such theories in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" is the "picture theory" of meaning. According to this theory propositions are meaningful insofar as they picture states of affairs or matters of empirical fact; anything normative, supernatural or metaphysical must, it therefore seems, be nonsense (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004). If fact is has been rather influential reading among the parts of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus".
The "picture theory of meaning" discussed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" is an account of the nature of meaning central to author's early philosophy. In attempting to understand the relation between language and world, Wittgenstein was struck y the analogy with picturing or modeling. Different colored counters, variously arranged, might be used in a courtroom to model a motoring accident, for example (Logue, 2010). Superficially, the counters may not resemble the physical objects they model, any more than propositions resemble the world; but propositions may still depict states of affairs, provided there are as many distinguishable elements within the proposition as within the situation it represents, so that the proposition possesses the appropriate pictorial form to be isomorphic to the state of affairs (Logue, 2010). Thus, pictorial form may not be evident on the surface, but will always be revealable by deep analysis.
Ludwig Wittgenstein's "picture theory of meaning" generates a distinction between what can be described and what can only be expressed in the symbolism (University of Cambridge, 2010). It is important to mention that the distinction between universal and particular falls in the latter class. Besides, many other things also fall in this class, including the supposed true propositions of philosophy.
The official terminology of Wittgenstein underlines the distinction with the terms 'saying' and 'showing' or 'expressing'. The author indicates in his work: "What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it... What can be shown, cannot be said." ("Tractatus", 4.121, 4.1212).
It is interesting how in the book by Wittgenstein ordinary propositional signs of English are built up out of elementary propositions. In his work he expressed an idea that the propositional logical constants (a collection of signs that appear to have a peculiar simplicity) can be represented as truth-functions (functions that take a truth-value, or ordered pair of truth-values, or whatever, into a single truth-value) (University of Cambridge, 2010). One more peculiarity of the "picture theory of meaning" is that Wittgenstein considered that identity could be eliminated from a sign language be the simple device of using different signs for different objects ("Tractatus", 5.531). As he mentioned in his book: "The identity sign, therefore, is not an essential constituent of conceptual notation."
But despite the fact that "picture theory of meaning" in "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" has been an influential part of reading, but it leads to serious problems since by its own lights the Tractatus' use of words like "object", "reality" and "world" is illegitimate (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004). The "picture theory of meaning" therefore denies sense to just the kind of statements of which "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" is composed, to the framework supporting the picture theory itself.
As to the importance of the objection regarding the fact that Ludwig Wittgenstein does not give any examples of elementary sentences in the book, we can say that the sentences of "Tractatus Logico-Philisophicus" would not qualify as meaningful according to its own strict criteria. Moreover, the method of Wittgenstein presented in his book does not follow its own demands regarding the only rigid and correct philosophical method.
Moreover, an interesting thing is when Wittgenstein writes in his book: "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless" ("Tractatus", 6.54). Besides, we can say that the whole book is very ironic, and it can even emphasize the nonsensicality of any sentence attempting to say something very deep and metaphysical, about logic and logical concepts, and about those abstract things that should be passed over in silence.
I made a complaint because I wasn't satisified with it:
This paper is very poorly written, it fails to answer the questions I submitted.
It doesn\'t even mention the terms "facts", "logical form", "configuration" etc which are necessary to even try to explain the Picture theory of meaning.
The paper was also supposed to mention in which way Wittgensteins lack of examples was an undermining of his theory, which it doesn\'t.
I was given a credit for a new paper as "compensation" so I chose to send in a new paper request:
Write a critical analysis of the article Naming and Necessity by Saul Kripke.
Choose 1-2 arguments in the text and try to give some critical input regarding the force of the arguments, their implications and wether or not you find them plausible i.e. in relation to common intuitions etc.
Concentrate on a few arguments and give a thourough inquiry regarding them, don't try to dissicate the whole article.
This is what I got:
Saul Kripke: Naming and NecessityTraditionally, human communication and the process of naming were closely intertwined because the perception of the surrounding world, objects and people was closely intertwined with communication. In fact, it is in the course of the communication people give names to objects, issues and phenomena because they need to develop names, which are recognized by all people and they are necessary to be accorded with other people. In this regard, one individual cannot give names to objects, people or phenomena without consent and agreement with other people. For instance, white cannot be black for one individual, when the rest of the society still believes that white is white. In such a context, it is possible to agree with Kripke's article "Name and Necessity" where the author attempts to trace the process of naming and reveals the necessity that pushes to naming. In this regard, the author has revealed a strong impact of communication on the process of naming and revelation of necessity of naming which derives from communication because, in the course of communication, people need to use names and concepts which are comprehensible to them, otherwise, the communication would be impossible or, at any rate, ineffective.
In actuality, Kripke develops quite a complex argument concerning naming and necessity but he tends to distinguish these two concepts. To put it more precisely, Kripke discusses
them separately but, in actuality, these concepts are closely intertwined and the discussion of naming within the context of necessity would be more logical and effective to prove the righteousness of the position of the author. Nevertheless, Kripke develops a number of noteworthy arguments which are worth of detailed studying. In this regard, it is possible to refer to Kripke's argument that what "can be known a priori" doesn't mean "must be known a priori". At this point, it is worth mentioning the fact that the author attempts to distinguish what can be known and what must be known. What is meant here is the fact that, on the one hand, the author implies the ability or possibility to know, whereas, on the other hand, the author implies the obligation to know. In fact, this difference is very important in terms of understanding and critical evaluation of his argument. To put it more precisely, Kripke stands on the ground that there are names or concept that can be known a priori. This means that people know some names or concepts a priori. For instance, they can learn some information from other in the course of their communication before they get acquainted with a concept or object directly. In such a way, when people come across an object, which they have already heard about, they can know this object a priori. In this regard, Kripke distinguishes concepts or objects which people must know a priori. In fact, this means that people must give names a priori. What Kripke means here is the obligation to know a priori. In practice,
this means that people are obliged certain facts, concepts, objects and so on, i.e. they are obliged to know names, probably out of necessity. At this point, it is important to stress that Kripke argues that what people can know a priori does not necessarily mean that they must know it a priori. To put it in simple words, Kripke argues that people have the possibility to know something, to know names, for instance, but they are not obliged to know them.
At first glance, Kripke is right. On extrapolating his argument on practice, it is possible to estimate that people have possibilities to learn a lot of information that they can know a priori. For instance, people can know that the light color is the color which normally warns people about some danger but, according to Kripke, people are not obliged to know it a priori. Therefore, people can have some ideas that when they cross a street and see the red light, they can suppose that the red light may warn about something but they are not obliged to stop at the sidewalk, when they see the red light because they are obliged to have the knowledge a priori. Basically, such a situation is quite possible because if people are in a new country or region they may fail to know all local specificities to the extent that even if they see the red light, before they cross the street, they do not necessarily obey to this warning because they are not obliged to know that the warning is serious enough to stop them.
However, it is obvious that they will put under a threat their life and health if there are cars in the street that makes the Kripke's argument irrelevant.
In this regard, it is important to understand that people can have the a priori knowledge but they are also obliged to have some a priori knowledge, which they may develop on the ground of what they can know a priori. In other words, people should develop associations to transform their potential knowledge into actual knowledge, to transform what they can know a priori into what they must know a priori.
At the same time, Kripke's arguments concerning necessity are often as debatable as his arguments concerning naming. For instance, Kripke states: Well, if something is wrong, it's obviously not necessarily true. If it is true, might it has been otherwise? In fact, this argument on necessity is not really persuading because the author refers rather to emotions of the audience than to reason. To put it more precisely, Kripke attempts to say that wrong means untrue or false. However, in such a context the question arises: what the wrong actually is. In all probability, people may have different views on what is right and what wrong. In addition, if something is wrong than this means that people feel it being wrong. In other words they dislike it but it does not necessarily mean that it is not true, as Kripke estimates. In stark contrast, if something is wrong, it can be true because
unpleasant and wrong things may happen and they are true. For instance, if a plane crash down and a family is informed about the death of a family member. Naturally, the family does not like it and feel the death of the relative being wrong, therefore, according to Kripke's argument, the relative is not necessarily dead because it is necessarily true. But, in actuality, the relative is dead and that is true, even though the family does not like it and believes that the information they get is wrong.
Thus, Kripke's arguments are not always consistent and relevant.
My response:Hi!
This paper is completely useless and all wrong.
It doesn't even mention anything about rigid designators which is the basis for the whole theory.
It talks about things that are irrelvent to the article and false:
"To put it more precisely, Kripke stands on the ground that there are names or concept that can be known a priori. This means that people know some names or concepts a priori."
"At this point, it is important to stress that Kripke argues that what people can know a priori does not necessarily mean that they must know it a priori. To put it in simple words, Kripke argues that people have the possibility to know something, to know names, for instance, but they are not obliged to know them. "
"In stark contrast, if something is wrong, it can be true because unpleasant and wrong things may happen and they are true. For instance, if a plane crash down and a family is informed about the death of a family member. Naturally, the family does not like it and feel the death of the relative being wrong, therefore, according to Kripke's argument, the relative is not necessarily dead because it is necessarily true. But, in actuality, the relative is dead and that is true, even though the family does not like it and believes that the information they get is wrong."
This is completely wrong......he doesn't say anything about that.
Second anwser after they offered me a revision when it already was past the deadline:
Hi,
If you don't refund me my money asap I will expose your site on the internet(essayscam.org etc) as fraudulent.
Their answer:
do not try to blackmail us!!!
Or I'll forward this email as well as your name, address, IP address, e-mail address to the authorities !!!
we do not offer refunds! If you want some revision, no problem!!
Angela Newman.
My answer:
Sure do so, contact the authorities and we'll see what they'll say!
That was my last warning.
Last answer from them:
ok!
I just suggest you, do not play this game with our company! We know what to do with the customers like you, who just want to get completed paper for free.
so, think twice before taking some actions.
Angela Newman.
They've removed all info regarding the paper from their site